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On August 3, 1977, the United States Congress enacted the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,'
("SMCRA"). The prohibition against surface coal mining op-
erations contained in Section 522(e) of SMCRA2 does not apply
to surface coal mining operations which are subject to "valid
existing rights." However, SMCRA does not provide a definition
for "valid existing rights."
To date, the Department of the Interior, Office of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement ("OSMRE"), has been
unable to promulgate a regulation defining valid existing rights.
Presently, three definitions are under consideration. These defi-
nitions are referred to as:
1. The modified all permits test;
2. The takings test; and
3. The ownership and control test.
My discussion as to the appropriate test for defining valid
existing rights is from the perspective of a state which, pursuant
to Section 503 of SMCRA, 3 has obtained jurisdiction to enforce
SMCRA. Before analyzing the tests for defining valid existing
rights, it is necessary to consider what functions a regulation
implementing SMCRA must possess.
4
* Assistant Counsel, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environ-
mental Resources, Office of the Chief Counsel, Harrisburg, Pa. B.A. 1976, University
of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1979, University of Pennsylvania School of Law.
The views and opinions in this paper are those of the author and do not represent
the official position of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Pub. Law. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988)).
2 SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1988).
3 SMCRA § 503, 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (1988).
1 In order to obtain and retain jurisdiction to enforce SMCRA a state must adopt
a coal mining program which implements the requirements of SMCRA and its regula-
tions, SMCRA § 503, 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (1988); and 30 C.F.R. §§ 723 and 733 (1988).
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In general, regulations clarify and implement the require-
ments of a statute. SMCRA also contains some specific provi-
sions relating to the purpose of implementing regulations.
Congress found that national "surface mining and reclamation
standards are essential in order to insure that competition in
interstate commerce among sellers of coal produced in different
States will not be used to undermine the ability of the several
States to improve and maintain adequate standards on coal
mining, operations within their borders." 5 Furthermore, the pur-
poses for which SMCRA was enacted include:
1. The establishment "of a nationwide program to protect
society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface
coal mining operations."
6
2. Assisting "the States in developing and implementing a
program to achieve the purposes of this Act."
7
Thus, any regulation promulgated by OSMRE must establish a
consistent national standard for defining valid existing rights and
assist the states in developing and implementing their own defi-
nitions for valid existing rights.
From a state's perspective, any regulation implementing
SMCRA should be as clear and unambiguous as possible. In
addition, any rules concerning the decision to issue a permit
should minimize the need for legal assistance. 8
When the language of a regulation implementing SMCRA is
ambiguous, a state's regulatory authority is uncertain as to the
appropriate requirements to be included in its program for im-
plementing SMCRA. 9 The greater the degree of ambiguity in the
SMCRA regulation, the greater the uncertainty for the state's
regulatory authority. Where the SMCRA regulation is ambigu-
ous, it is doubtful that a national standard for implementing
SMCRA will be established, or perceived to exist. As a result,
states are confronted with the argument that unless they adopt
a less restrictive-usually environmentally less protective-inter-
SMCRA § 101(g), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (1988).
SMCRA § 102(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1988).
SMCRA § 102(g), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(g) (1988).
This information is derived from my experience as a legal counselor to the coal
mining program, as well as conversations with individuals responsible for administering
Pennsylvania's coal mining program.
I Obviously few-if any-regulations are completely free from ambiguity, espe-
cially given the creativity of lawyers.
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pretation of the SMCRA regulation, the coal industry within
that state's jurisdiction is likely to move to other states which
have adopted a less restrictive interpretation of the SMCRA
regulation.
In addition, the individuals who determine whether to issue
a permit are not trained lawyers. A permitting decision requiring
a legal determination, e.g., whether a taking has occurred, is
beyond their area of expertise. As a result, a regulation including
a legal determination could significantly delay the permit review
process and possibly lead to inconsistent decisions. Theoretically,
this problem could be cured by each state establishing specific
criteria for its permit reviewers to apply. However, this approach
could result in each state establishing a different rule and thus
preventing the establishment of a national standard.
II. DEFINING VALID EXISTING RIGHTS
SMCRA does not contain a definition for valid existing
rights. Absent a clear definition the next best source is an
examination of the statute as a whole.
A. The Purpose of SMCRA
While SMCRA is the leading federal statute protecting the
public's health, safety and welfare' from the adverse environ-
mental impacts of surface coal mining operations, 1' the statute
does not include any findings that surface coal mining operations
are a nuisance.
SMCRA includes a finding that "coal mining operations
presently contribute significantly to the Nation's energy require-
ments," and that it is essential to ensure a growing and healthy
underground coal industry. 2 One purpose of SMCRA is to
assure that the nation's energy needs are provided for while
10 All coal mine point source discharges are subject to the requirements of the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System established by the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq. (1988).
11 Surface coal mining operations are defined broadly to include surface mine,
coal refuse disposal areas, coal preparation facilities, all surface activities conducted in
connection with a surface or underground coal mine, and the areas upon which these
activities are conducted or disturb the surface land, see SMCRA § 701 (28), 30 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1988).
12 SMCRA § 101(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (1988).
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striking a balance with a need to protect the environment and
agricultural productivity. 3
While coal mining operations are not declared to be a nui-
sance under SMCRA, coal mining operations are, at best, a
suspect activity and a necessary evil. SMCRA includes the fol-
lowing findings concerning the impact of mining activities.
[That] many surface mining operations result in distur-
bances of surface areas that burden and adversely affect com-
merce and the public welfare by destroying or diminishing the
utility of land for commercial, industrial, residential, recrea-
tional, agricultural, and forestry purposes by causing erosion
and landslides, by contributing to floods, by polluting the
water, by destroying fish and wildlife habitats, by impairing
natural beauty, by damaging the property of citizens, by cre-
ating hazards dangerous to life and property, by degrading the
quality of life in local communities, and by counteracting
governmental programs and efforts to conserve soil, water and
other natural resources.'
4
[That] the expansion of coal mining to meet the Nation's
energy needs makes even more urgent the establishment of
appropriate standards to minimize damage to the environment
and to productivity of the soil and to protect the health and
safety of the public. 5
[That] surface mining and reclamation technology are now
developed so that effective and reasonable regulation of surface
coal mining operations by the States and by the Federal Gov-
ernment in accordance with the requirements of this [Act] is
an appropriate and necessary means to minimize so far as
practicable the adverse social, economic, and environmental
effects of such mining operations.1
6
In addition, SMCRA was enacted for the following purposes:
[To] assure that the rights of surface landowners and other
persons with a legal interest in the land or appurtenances
thereto are fully protected from such operations.'
7
[To] assure that surface mining operations are not conducted
where reclamation as required by this [Act] is not feasible.' 8
' SMCRA § 102(0, 30 U.S.C. § 1202(0 (1988).
SMCRA § 101(c), 30 US.C. § 1201(c) (1988).
SMCRA § 101(d), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (1988).
6 SMCRA § 101(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(e) (1988).
1 SMCRA § 102(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(b) (1988).
" SMCRA § 102(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (1988).
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[To] assure that surface coal mining operations are so con-
ducted as to protect the environment.19
[To] assure that adequate procedures are undertaken to reclaim
surface areas as contemporaneously as possible with the surface
coal mining operations. 20
B. The Regulation of Surface Coal Mining Operations
In general, the above-cited findings and purposes of SMCRA
are implemented through the requirements contained in Sections
506, 507, 508, 510, 515, and 516 of SMCRA. 21 For example,
within eight months of when a state obtains jurisdiction to
enforce SMCRA, all mining activity within that state must be
authorized by a permit issued pursuant to the new program.
22
All individuals with an ownership interest in the coal seam
to be mined and the surface lands to be affected by the proposed
mining activity must be identified in the permit application.
23
The application shall also identify the surface lands which the
applicant has the right to enter and commence surface mining
operations thereon and the documents upon which the applicant
bases its right to conduct the surface mining operations. 24 The
permit application must also contain detailed information on the
proposed mining activity, the hydrogeology of the area to be
mined, the climatology of the area to be mined, and a deter-
mination of the probable hydrologic consequences of the mining
and reclamation operations both on and off the site.
A reclamation plan must be submitted as part of the permit
application. 25 In essence, the reclamation plan demonstrates how
the applicant will restore the affected land to a condition capable
of supporting its pre-mining uses.
26
Before a permit can be issued the applicant has the burden
of demonstrating that the proposed mining and reclamation
activities will comply with all the requirements of SMCRA. 27
-9 SMCRA § 102(d), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (1988).
o SMCRA § 102(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(e) (1988).
2- 30 U.S.C. §§ 1256, 1257, 1258, 1260, 1265 and 1266.
- See SMCRA § 506, 30 U.S.C. § 1256 (1988).
23 See SMCRA § 507(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1257(b) (1988).
- See SMCRA § 507(b)(9), 30 U.S.C. § 1257(b)(9) (1988).
25 See SMCRA § 508(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1258(a) (1988).
- SMCRA § 508, 30 U.S.C. § 1258 (1988).
2 SMCRA § 510(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1260(a) (1988).
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Where the applicant only owns the mineral estate, the applicant
must demonstrate that it has the right to extract the coal by
surface mining methods. 28 To make this demonstration, the ap-
plicant can submit either the surface landowner's written consent
to the extraction of coal by the surface mining method, or a
legally binding conveyance which gives the applicant this right.
29
Finally, all permitted surface coal mining operations must
comply with the performance standards contained in Sections
515 and 516 of SMCRA.3 0 By adhering to these performance
standards, the authorized coal mining activity will presumably
be conducted in a manner which protects the environment and
agricultural productivity.
C. Areas Unsuitable for Mining Activity
Even though a proposed mining operation complies with all
of the technical requirements of Sections 506, 508, 510, 515 and
516 of SMCRA, 1 any portion of that proposed mining activity
may not be permitted if it is on lands which are declared un-
suitable for mining activity. All state programs implementing
SMCRA must include a process enabling the state to determine
which lands within its jurisdiction are unsuitable for all or certain
types of surface coal mining operations.32 Lands may be declared
unsuitable for surface coal mining operations where the mining
will be incompatible with existing land use programs, could
damage significant cultural, historic, scientific or aesthetic values
or natural systems, could affect water supplies or the production
of food or fiber products, or could affect natural hazard lands
and thereby endanger life and property.3"
The prohibition against mining in lands declared unsuitable
for mining is not absolute. The prohibition does not apply to
coal exploration activities.3 4 In addition, this prohibition does
not apply to lands where the mining operation was in existence
on August 3, 1977, where the mining operation was issued a
permit under SMCRA prior to designating the land unsuitable
-' SMCRA § 510(b)(6), 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(6) (1988).
29 Id.
30 30 U.S.C. §§ 1265, 1266 (1988).
3 30 U.S.C. §§ 1256, 1258, 1260, 1265, 1266 (1988).
32 SMCRA § 522(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(1) (1988).
3 SMCRA § 522(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(2) (1988).
SMCRA § 522(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(1) (1988).
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for mining, or where substantial legal and financial commitments
in the mining operation were made prior to January 4, 1977. 31
In addition to providing the discretionary authority to declare
certain lands unsuitable for mining activity, SMCRA mandates
that surface coal mining operations be prohibited upon certain
lands. This prohibition applies to:
Lands within national parks, national wildlife refuges, national
trails, national wilderness preservation areas, wild and scenic
river areas, and national recreation areas.
Lands within any national forest.
Any lands where the mining activity may adversely affect any
publicly owned park or places included in the National Register
of Historic Sites.
Lands within 300 feet of any occupied dwelling, public build-
ing, school, church, community or institutional building or
public park.
Within 100 feet of a cemetery or the outer right-of-way line
of any public road. a
6
This prohibition does not apply where the operation was in
existence on August 3, 1977 or the operation is subject to valid
existing rights.
D. So What Are Valid Existing Rights?
A mining operation is subject to valid existing rights when
the applicant's rights in the proposed mining operation are so
significant that the applicant should be allowed to mine despite
Section 522(e)'s prohibition against mining operations. Section
522(e)'s prohibitions override SMCRA's general authorization to
mine under Sections 507-510. Therefore, the rights significant
enough to authorize mining operations upon lands protected by
Section 522(e) must be more significant than the rights necessary
to obtain a permit under SMCRA, i.e., ownership of the coal
seam and the right to mine it.
While the ownership and control test would be a fairly clear
and unambiguous test, it has the effect of throwing the prover-
bial baby out with the bath water. Therefore, defining valid
existing rights as the ownership of the coal seam and the right
11 SMCRA § 522(a)(6), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(6) (1988).
36 SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. 1272(e).
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to mine it renders Section 522(e) meaningless because almost all
lands will be subject to valid existing rights.
In contrast to the mandatory prohibitions of Section 522(e),
a state may, at its discretion, declare lands unsuitable for mining
activity. Therefore, valid existing rights must be more significant
than the significant legal and financial commitments which over-
ride a state's discretionary authority under Section 522(a)(2) to
prohibit mining. Since the prohibition against mining under Sec-
tion 522(e) is mandatory, the rights sufficient to override this
prohibition must be more significant than the economic rights
which can override a prohibition that only comes into effect at
the state's discretion.
Thus, valid existing rights are those rights which are so
significant that applying Section 522(e)'s prohibition against min-
ing operations will act as a taking of property in violation of
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Otherwise, in
certain instances Section 522(e) could subject a state government
to claims for the value of the coal seam being taken.
However, a regulation merely defining valid existing rights
as an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation
is unworkable. Such a regulation would fail to establish a na-
tional norm due to the wide variance in court decisions. Fur-
thermore, due to the ambiguity in existing case law, this regulation
provides little guidance to state administrators as to the appro-
priate rule to apply. Finally, no decision to issue a permit
involving the valid existing rights issue could be made without
legal assistance.
Therefore, OSMRE must publish a regulation attempting to
define when a taking of property occurs. No regulation will be
completely accurate. There will always be a chance that someone
may successfully challenge a denial of valid existing rights on
grounds that Section 522(e) acts as an unconstitutional taking
of property. In developing a regulation, OSMRE must balance
the need to implement the protections of Section 522(e) against
the risk-including potential costs-that in specific instances the
denial of valid existing rights may lead to a conclusion that
Section 522(e) acts as a taking of property.
III. PENNSYLVANIA'S DEFINITION FOR VALID EXISTING RIGHTS
A. The Definition
Under Pennsylvania law, except for haul roads, valid existing
rights are defined as:
[VOL. 5:645
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[T]hose property rights in existence on August 3, 1977, that
were created by a legally binding conveyance, lease, deed,
contract, or other document which authorizes the applicant to
produce minerals by a surface mining operation; and provided
further that the person proposing to conduct surface mining
operations on such lands holds all current State and Federal
permits necessary to conduct such operations on those lands
and either held those permits on August 3, 1977 or had made
by that date a complete application for the permits, variances,
and approvals required by the Department.17
This definition is similar to the good faith-all permits test
under consideration by OSMRE. There are two differences be-
tween Pennsylvania's definition and OSMRE's proposed defini-
tion.
Under OSMRE's proposed definition, an applicant's good
faith effort to obtain all permits required on August 3, 1977 is
an acceptable alternative to actually possessing all permits re-
quired on August 3, 1977. Pennsylvania's regulation defines this
good faith effort as the submission, by August 3, 1977, of a
complete application for all permits, variances and approvals
required by the Department.
Under OSMRE's definition, valid existing rights exist even
though the applicant did not make by August 3, 1977, a good
faith effort to obtain all permits then required, if the coal is
adjacent to and necessary for the continued operation of a coal
mine which was in existence on August 3, 1977. Pennsylvania's
definition does not take into account whether the coal to be
subject to valid existing rights is necessary for the continued
operation of a mine.
B. Does Pennsylvania's Definition for Valid Existing Rights
Avoid Unconstitutional Takings of Property?
There is only one case alleging that the prohibition against
mining under Pennsylvania's counterpart to Section 522(e) of
SMCRA is an unconstitutional taking of property. In Willow-
brook Mining Company v. Commonwealth, DER,38 the Com-
monwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that the prohibition of
mining within 300 feet of an occupied dwelling did not act as
an unconstitutional taking of the mine operator's property.
37 25 PA. ADbIN. CODE § 86.1 (1989).
3- 499 A.2d 2 (1985).
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However, this ruling was based upon a finding that the mine
operator had failed to introduce any evidence on the taking
issue. Therefore, Willowbrook Mining Company does not pro-
vide any guidance as to when the prohibition against mining
pursuant to Pennsylvania's counterpart to Section 522(e) will
constitute an unconstitutional taking of property.
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation As-
sociation,39 the Supreme Court held that the prohibitions against
mining contained in Section 522(e) of SMCRA40 are not an
uncompensated taking of private property in violation of the
just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Hodel was in response to a facial challenge to
Section 522(e). Therefore, in specific instances prohibiting min-
ing under Section 522(e) of SMCRA, or a state's counterpart to
that section, valid existing rights may be held to be an uncon-
stitutional taking of private property.
In determining whether an application of Section 522(e) is
an unconstitutional taking of property the courts will engage in
an ad hoc balancing of several factors. 4' The courts usually
examine the economic impact of the regulation, the regulation's
interference with investment-backed expectations, and the char-
acter of the government's action.
42
Where the government's action can be characterized as an
exercise of the police power to prevent a nuisance, courts are
likely to conclude that the regulation was not a taking of prop-
erty. 43 In many of the cases cited, the Court has allowed rather
significant reductions in the economic value of the property
being regulated. However, the Court has never held that a reg-
ulation was not a taking of property in the face of a finding
that the total economic value of the property has been taken.
As stated above, SMCRA makes surface coal mining oper-
ations a suspect activity." Section 522(e) of SMCRA goes beyond
SMCRA's general restrictions and prohibits mining upon certain
452 U.S. 264 (1981).
SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1988).
' See e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
42 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 470.
43 See e.g., Keystone, 480 U.S. at 470; Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915); and Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
- See SMCRA §§ 101, 102, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202 (1988).
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lands. For some of the protected lands, this prohibition may be
waived by either a regulatory authority or the landowner. Thus,
Congress has determined that mining upon lands protected by
Section 522(e) is a nuisance.
Since mining within the lands protected by Section 522(e) is
a nuisance, anyone claiming that an unconstitutional taking of
property has occurred must demonstrate an almost complete
elimination of the economic value of their property and/or
complete interference with legitimate investment backed expec-
tations. This will be a sliding scale. The more significant the
nuisance being prevented, (e.g., prevention of damage to occu-
pied dwellings or environmentally sensitive lands), then the greater
the diminution in the economic value or the interference with
investment backed expectations before an unconstitutional taking
of property will be found.
Given the Supreme Court's holdings in cases such as Gold-
blatt v. Hempstead,45 Hadacheck v. Sebastian,46 and Mugler v.
Kansas,47 anyone claiming an unconstitutional taking of property
must show an almost complete diminution in the economic value
of their property due to Section 522(e). If the issue is the
economically viable use of the coal then the claimant must show
that the entire mine, actual or proposed -not just the coal lying
within the lands protected by Section 522(e)-is rendered val-
ueless a.4 In addition, it is unlikely that the courts will find that
a taking has occurred if either the claimant possesses any other
economic interest in the surface land or other minerals lying
within the lands covered by Section 522(e) or if there is the
possibility that another mining method would be allowed under
Section 522(e).
49
Under Pennsylvania's definition for valid existing rights, a
mine operator must both possess the right to mine the coal on
August 3, 1977 and have either obtained or submitted a complete
application for all permits required on August 3, 1977. It is
difficult to see how Section 522(e) interferes with the mine
operator's legitimate investment-backed expectations, unless as
45 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
- 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
47 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
48 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 470.
49 See Indiana Department of Natural Resources, et al. v. Indiana Coal Council,
542 N.E.2d 1000 (1989); and Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394
(1989).
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of August 3, 1977, that mine operator had obtained the own-
ership interests necessary to mine the coal and had attempted to
obtain all permits then required for mining the coal.
CONCLUSIONS
Based upon Pennsylvania's experience, the modified good
faith-all permits test is a good definition for valid existing rights.
In most applications this definition will exempt from Section
522(e) only those coal mining operations where the application
of Section 522(e) would constitute an uncompensated taking of
private property in violation of Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.
Pennsylvania's rule might be overly restrictive in that valid
existing rights do not exist just because the additional lands are
adjacent to and essential for the continued operation of a surface
coal mine operation which was in existence on August 3, 1977.
Whether failing to grant valid existing rights in this situation
results in Section 522(e) acting as an unconstitutional taking of
property without compensation is highly speculative.
The other area of uncertainty is where most of the lands to
be mined lie within 300 feet of a park. Pennsylvania is currently
facing several cases involving this scenario. In addition to the
factors described above, resolution of this type of case may turn
on whether the park was established prior to the enactment of
the prohibitions against mining.
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